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I. INTRODUCTION
In the end, William S. Richardson was hailed as a "legal giant."' The
jurisprudence of the Chief Justice, including the body of property cases 2 he
authored for the Hawai'i Supreme Court, was equally acclaimed.
Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i at
Minoa. This article is dedicated to Brian Nakamura and Larry Storch. The author would
also like to thank Laura Chen Allen for editing assistance.
1 See Mary Vorsino & Ken Kobayashi, A Legal Giant, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER,
June 22, 2010, available at http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/hawaiinews/
20100622 alegalgiant.html.
2 This body of cases includes In re Robinson, 49 Haw. 429, 421 P.2d 570 (1966)
(interpreting Land Commission Awards and Royal Patents); In re Property Situate at
Moiliili, 49 Haw. 537, 425 P.2d 83 (1967) (asserting an interpretation of the School Lands
Act of 1850 by which lands used as schools were exempt from passing into private
ownership under the Great Mahele); Schimmelfenning v. Grove Farm Co., 50 Haw. 166, 434
P.2d 314 (1967) (affirming a traditional and customary duty to keep auwai (irrigation
ditches) clean; plaintiff landowner could not receive any damages from defendant because
plaintiffs failure to receive water resulted from his own failure to maintain the auwai);
Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968) (recognizing traditional Hawaiian
customary access rights and establishing traditional Hawaiian usage as the context within
which Western property rights must be interpreted); In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d
76 (1968) (holding that location of boundary described as "ma ke kai" was along upper
reaches of the wash of the waves, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation or by the line
of debris left by the wash of the waves; first of three landmark decisions that changed the
shoreline demarcation between public and private boundaries on beaches); McBryde Sugar
Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (Abe, J.), aff'd on reh'g, 55 Haw. 260, 517
P.2d 26 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that water cannot be privately owned and that riparian
and appurtenant users have the right to use, but not own, such water; although written by
Justice Abe, McBryde is identified as part of Richardson's jurisprudence because he
personally defended the opinion from constitutional attack in federal court and because he
reaffirmed its holding in his own opinion in Robinson v. Ariyoshi); County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973) (holding that seaward boundary of landowner's
lot should have been located along the vegetation line, not the debris line; second of the
three shoreline cases); In re Sanborn, 57 Haw. 585, 562 P.2d 771 (1977) (applying Ashford
to property registered with the Land Court and holding that any purported registration of
land below the upper reaches of the wash of the waves was ineffective; third of the three
shoreline cases); State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 556 P.2d 725 (1977)
(holding that land newly formed by a lava flow belonged to the State, not to the abutting
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During his seventeen years as chief justice he became known for decisions
in property law that expanded the beaches4 and preserved state waters5 and
newly-added volcanic lands6 for the people of Hawai'i. Today, those and
other decisions have become the foundation of natural resources law in the
State of Hawai'i.
landowner); United Congregational & Evangelical Churches v. Heirs of Kamamalu, 59
Haw. 334, 582 P.2d 208 (1978) (reaffirming the interpretation of the 1850 School Lands Act
in the Moiliili case and holding that, despite the State's claim to title in the subject property,
the United Churches possessed an easement to the property as long as they continued to use
the property for religious and educational purposes); Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian
Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982) (establishing standing of beneficiaries to
sue under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 and recognizing that the State,
through the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, has a fiduciary relationship to
beneficiaries); County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653
P.2d 766 (1982) (holding that developers may not rely on approvals or permits issued after
certification of a referendum to repeal a zoning ordinance affecting the development site);
Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 653 P.2d 1130 (1982) (establishing trail and access
rights across private property and affirming the validity of Hawai'i Revised Statutes sections
1-1 and 7-1); Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 571 (1982)
(reallocating rights to taro farmers and invalidating purchases and appurtenant water rights
from the lands); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (imposing a
public trust over state waters and establishing a legal basis for the legislatively-created state
water code); and Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982) (reaffirming
gathering and access rights within a tenant's own ahupua'a).
3 See DAN BOYLAN & T. MICHAEL HOLMES, JOHN A. BURNS: THE MAN AND His TIMES
304 (2000) (quoting Bambi Weil, a reporter who eventually became a state judge, as saying
that the Hawai'i Supreme Court under Richardson "was an activist court in the best tradition
of the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren"); Michael Tsai,
Former Chief Justice William S. Richardson Dies, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, June 21,
2010, available at http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/FormerChiefJusticeWilliam_ S
Richardsondies.html ("But it was as head of the state's highest court that Richardson's
impact was greatest. With Richardson at the helm from 1966 to 1982, the Richardson court
handed down a series of judgments that assured public access to beaches, upheld traditional
Hawaiian laws on access to kuleana lands, and affirmed public ownership of water and other
natural resources. The decisions were consistent with Richardson's controversial stand that
western exclusivity concepts were not always consistent or applicable in Hawaii."); see also
A. A. Smyser, Richardson Court Bent Rules in Public's Favor, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN,
Oct. 17, 1989, at A14 (comparing favorably the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson
with that of Chief Justice Warren).
4 In re Sanborn, 57 Haw. 585, 562 P.2d 771 (1977); Cnty. of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55
Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973); In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968).
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982); Reppun v. Bd. of Water
Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982).
6 State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 556 P.2d 725 (1977).
See Diamond v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 112 Haw. 161, 145 P.3d 704 (2006);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 205A-1 (2001) (defining shoreline as consistent with the holdings of
Ashford, Sotomura, and Sanborn); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiihole 1), 94
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It was not always this way, and his jurisprudence' was not always
universally acclaimed. Thirty years ago, when first rendered, those
decisions were bitterly and vehemently contested in certain quarters.9 To
opponents, these decisions were radical departures from existing state law.' 0
Critics called them pure policy-oriented decisions," implying that Chief
Justice Richardson avoided applying settled law12 simply to reach results
that were to his personal liking.
Today, it is different. The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson is
more than merely accepted as settled simply because it is final; it is hailed as
defining a new, historically oriented approach to the law of property. For
example, the three decisions that Chief Justice Richardson authored as to
shoreline boundaries 3 have become settled law. His opinion in Robinson
v. Ariyoshi has established the legal context by which all water rights are
Haw. 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000) (affirming the imposition of a public trust over the waters of the
State as asserted in Robinson v. Ariyoshi); see also Simeon L. Vance & Richard J.
Wallsgrove, More than a Line in the Sand Defining the Shoreline in Hawai'i After
Diamond v. State, 29 U. HAW. L. REv. 521 (2007); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i
Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995), cert. denied sub nom. Nansay
Haw. Inc. v. Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 517 U.S. 1163 (1996) (adopting Palama v.
Sheehan and Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.).
8 It is important to clarify what is meant by the jurisprudence of Chief Justice
Richardson. Every majority opinion officially represents the views of a number of judges
or justices. We cannot know, therefore, the specific role of the chief justice in these
property decisions. It is with this caveat in mind that one speaks about the "jurisprudence"
of Chief Justice Richardson or the "Richardson Court." Nonetheless, such a reference is
fair when one examines and counts the common elements of those decisions-a deep
understanding of the true history of Hawai'i, a basic sense of fairness, and an awareness of
the uncommon political forces that brought Chief Justice Richardson to the Hawai'i
Supreme Court in 1966. One assumes that while the results are those in which a majority
must concur, much of the logic, the reasoning, and passion of these decisions arises from the
sense and sensibilities of Chief Justice Richardson.
9 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1468
(9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986), remanded to 796 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1986),
remanded to 676 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Haw. 1987), rev'd, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989);
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 703 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Haw. 1989) (motion for costs and fees), rev'd
and vacated, 933 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1991); see also J. Russell Cades, Judicial Legislation in
the Supreme Court of Hawai'i: A Brief Introduction to the "Knowne Uncertaintie" of the
Law, 7 HAW. B.J. 58 (1970).
10 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Haw. 260, 262, 517 P.2d 26, 27 (1973)
(Levinson, J., dissenting).
' See cases cited supra note 9.
12 McBryde, 55 Haw. at 303, 517 P.2d at 50 (Levinson, J., dissenting); see also Smyser,
supra note 3; Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 583 ("McBryde I therefore came as a shocking,
violent deviation from the solidly established case law-totally unexpected and impossible
to have been anticipated. It was a radical departure from prior decisions.").
13 See cases cited supra note 4.
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adjudicated.14  His opinion in State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring settled the
principle that newly accreted volcanic lands are property of the state.' 5
Richardson's opinions in Palama v. Sheehan'6 and Kalipi v. Hawaiian
Trust Co.17 are equally important for affirming the legal basis for asserting
gathering and access rights on private property and were the backbone of the
landmark decision in Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County
Planning Commission.'8
The bold decisions of Chief Justice Richardson demonstrated how a jurist
could support the rights of the people without resorting to legislation from
the bench. Richardson may have been considered "activist" because he
used the power of the court to create profound, progressive change, but he
did so by reaching back into history and precedent and thus showing a
respect for the deep-rooted values of the Western legal system. Today,
nominees to the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i are
held to the standard set by Chief Justice Richardson. This article addresses
how and why the jurisprudence of the Chief Justice, once so controversial,
has become so celebrated today.
The Chief Justice succeeded in part because of his personality and place
in history: he was the right man, at the right time, with the right tools. He
also succeeded because of the nature of his jurisprudence, which had four
qualities: it was constitutional, restorative, unifying, and island-based.
His jurisprudence survived constitutional attack. It was restorative of
Hawaiian sovereignty and values, yet it was also unifying, uniting Hawaiians
and the immigrant communities that had settled in Hawai'i. Finally, it was
a jurisprudence particularly appropriate for an island society. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that the life of the law was not logic, but
experience.' 9 The jurisprudence of the Chief Justice succeeded because it
was tailored to the uniqueness of Hawai'i's island history and experience.
Generally speaking, the Chief Justice's jurisprudence succeeded because
it was the legal embodiment of the political motto of Hawai'i-that the life
of the land is perpetuated in righteousness. To Chief Justice Richardson,
the life of the law was itself perpetuated in righteousness. This
14 See In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole 1), 94 Haw. 97, 9 P.3d 409
(2000) (affirming the imposition of a public trust over the waters of the State as asserted in
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982)).
" 58 Haw. 106, 556 P.2d 1079 (1979).
16 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968).
" 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
18 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995), cert denied sub nom. Nansay Haw. Inc. v. Pub.
Access Shoreline Haw., 517 U.S. 1163 (1996) (adopting Palama v. Sheehan and Kalipi v.
Hawaiian Trust Co.).
19 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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righteousness meant, at its most basic, that the power to make law was a
trust. Those who were lawmakers were kahu, or stewards, whose primary
responsibility was to care for those for whom the laws were made. The
values and needs of the governed must be reflected in the laws themselves.
Importantly, the phrase "the life of the law" meant that the law itself was
alive-not dead, static, or pre-existing. The law must grow and evolve as
necessary. This is the credo of an activist jurist.
Part II of this article looks at Chief Justice Richardson as a person and
examines his success. Part III elaborates on his jurisprudence as having the
right "fit"-as restorative, unifying, and island-based. Part IV examines
the controversy over the constitutionality of his jurisprudence and whether
his jurisprudence violated the Constitution by taking property without just
compensation. His jurisprudence was not, as alleged by his critics, a
radical departure from pre-existing law. Instead, his jurisprudence was
corrective, rectifying errors made by earlier courts. Those courts had erred
in accepting the unrighteous, un-pono common law of the Territory of
Hawai'i, an undemocratic period of Hawai'i's history.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARDSON: THE RIGHT PERSON AT THE RIGHT TIME
WITH THE RIGHT INSTRUMENT
Chief Justice Richardson was the right man because he belonged to two
key political and ethnic communities within post-statehood Hawai'i. He
was a Hawaiian and he was a Democrat. These were separate communities
at that time, and he had the ability to bridge the two.
He also had the right tool. His instrument was the state supreme court.
As Chief Justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, he was the leader of an
institution that had the power to establish the property law of the State of
Hawai'i with finality.
His timing was also superb. He was appointed chief justice at the
beginning of statehood and was the first chief justice selected by Democrat
John A. Bums. The Democrats controlled Hawai'i and would control
Hawai'i for many years. The appointment of William S. Richardson as
chief justice would be followed by the appointment of many like-minded
20Democrats. In time, the new majority would be in a position to render a
new and transformative jurisprudence.
20 See CAROL S. DODD, THE RICHARDSON YEARS: 1966-1982, at 49-82 (1985).
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A. The Instrument
Chief Justice Richardson had the precise tool needed to carve his
jurisprudential legacy: the Hawai'i Supreme Court. In the Supreme
Court he had the power to make state property law with finality. It is
settled law in the United States that the various states are sovereign21 as to
the law of property.22 Thus, each state supreme court is the final arbiter
with regard to the property law of that state.23
He also knew the importance of the Hawai'i Supreme Court in shaping
history. He was knowledgeable about Hawaiian culture, politics, and
history by birth, family, and ancestry.24 He was also a lawyer from a family
of lawyers. His grandfather had been a judge and counsel to Queen
Lili'uokalani. 25  William Richardson knew the importance of the Supreme
Court in the political history of Hawai'i. He knew its significance as to
property law, particularly law that led to the demise and dispossession of the
Hawaiian people.26
Equally important, he was a Democrat. He was close to the Nisei, the
second-generation Japanese-Americans. He knew them from shared
experiences in World War II. He knew them from the practice of law. He
knew them from working within the Democratic Party. He shared their
21 See Williamson B.C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts "Take"
Property?, 2 U. HAw. L. REv. 57, 59 (1979) [hereinafter Chang, Unraveling].
22 See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); see also
Chang, Unraveling, supra note 21; Cent. Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 112 (1895)
("When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course of judicial proceedings, an
erroneous decision of a state court does not deprive the unsuccessful party of this property
without due process of law, within the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.").
23 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 677, 658 P.2d 287, 303 (1982). "That our
state supreme court is the final arbiter within our state system of constitutional issues arising
in or from a particular case is supported by the fact that the United States Supreme Court is
authorized to consider and will consider only final judgments in its review and that the
takings issue was presented as part of final judgment before the Supreme Court in the
McBryde appeal. The Supreme Court has stated the test of finality for the purposes of review
is whether the state appeals court 'has in fact fully adjudicated rights and that that
adjudication is not subject to further review by a state court."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 268 (1942)); see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
24 He had grown up in a political family with deep ties to the Hawaiian monarchy.
25 See DODD, supra note 20, at 17.
26 As discussed in Robinson, 65 Haw. at 667-77, 658 P.2d at 305-12, the following
cases established ownership rights in surplus water, thus benefitting the sugar industry:
Peck v. Bailey, 8 Haw. 658 (1867); Lonoaea v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 9 Haw. 651 (1895);
Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 14 Haw. 50 (1902), on
subsequent appeal, 15 Haw. 675 (1904); Carter v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47 (1917); and
Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376 (1930).
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understanding of the plantation experience. Richardson knew the role that
the Hawai'i Supreme Court and the law played in the discrimination, racism
and oppression that occurred during the plantation era. He would, as chief
justice, use the Hawai'i Supreme Court to forge a corrective
jurisprudence-one that would correct past harms to both Hawaiians and
immigrants.
Thus, at statehood, he had precisely the right tool in his hands, the power
to make property law-right or wrong-that was final.27 As he would
remark later, after leaving the court:
Maybe the guy [himself as chief justice] was right. Maybe he was wrong,
you know (chuckles), but I do have that luxury in that, if I made some
mistakes, throughout the generations historians will be able to point them out
to me. What's done is done. What's right is right. Maybe when you run
the highest court in the state, when you say this is the law, it is the law.
(chuckles) It's a little tough for someone to say you're wrong because that is
the law.28
B. The Moment
William S. Richardson would never have been selected as a chief justice
during the territorial period. The justices of the Territorial Supreme Court
were selected by the President of the United States. The residents of
Hawai'i could not vote for the President. Thus, Hawai'i residents had no
impact on the President's appointment of a chief justice for the Territory.
The justices and judges of the territorial courts were not representative of the
common people of Hawai'i.29  The justices chosen by the President were
"insiders," attorneys from the large, predominantly white law firms that
represented the sugar interests and the Big Five companies-the oligarchy of
mercantile agents of the sugar plantations that effectively controlled the
economic and social structure of the Territory.30
27 Interview by Warren Nishimoto & Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. with William S. Richardson,
Chief Justice (ret.), Haw. Sup. Ct., in Honolulu, Haw. (Jan. 24, 1990) [hereinafter
Richardson Interview].
28 id.
29 See Elizabeth Pa Martin et al., Cultures in Conflict in Hawai'i: The Law and
Politics ofNative Hawaiian Water Rights, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 71, 97-98 (1996).
30 LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAI'I PoNo: AN ETHNIC AND POLTICAL HISTORY 152
(1961).
In some respects, Hawaii's oligarchy was different. No community of comparable
size on the mainland was controlled so completely by so few individuals for so long.
Rarely were political, economic, and social controls simultaneously enforced as in
Hawaii. Rarely were controls so personal, and rarely were they as immune from such
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William S. Richardson was an outsider, a member of the "downtown"
rather than the "uptown" bar. He recalled what it was like to practice
before territorial judges, appointed from afar and often not from Hawai'i:
And you get down to the judges, and that was one thing that really motivated
us to go for statehood because we didn't have any judges, you know. And it
was hard for a young lawyer, who had been through the war, to come back and
take a second class position in a trial, knowing that the judge wasn't catering
to you, he was catering to some secretary in the interior department, because
the Secretary of Interior would do the appointing of the judges. And you
never thought you had a fair shake as a lawyer. And I couldn't see going my
whole life as a second-class lawyer and getting judgments I didn't think was
fair.3 1
With statehood, justices were selected by the governor,32 who was
popularly elected. This meant that the justices, as appointed by the
governor, reflected the constituency that selected the governor. Thus, the
kind of person who became a justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court was
vastly different after statehood.
After statehood, justices and judges reflected the electorate: Hawaiians,
Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, and others. It was clear that one of the
consequences of statehood would be a judiciary comprised of persons more
representative of the people of Hawai'i.33  It was equally clear that an
attendant consequence of this shift would be a new judiciary rendering
different decisions.
Thus, there should have been little surprise that the Richardson Court,
now constituted by persons selected by the new, popularly-elected governor,
would challenge the jurisprudence set down by the Territorial Supreme
Court.34 It would be unrealistic to expect that the new court, made of
persons from different classes and different backgrounds than past courts,
would simply rubber-stamp the jurisprudence of the past.
counterforces as Eugene Deb's socialism, Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal as in Hawaii. For forty years, Hawaii's oligarchy
skillfully and meticulously spun its web of control over the Islands' politics, labor land
and economic institutions, without fundamental challenge.
Id.
31 Richardson Interview, supra note 27.
32 See HAw. CONST. art. VI, § 3. In 1978, the Hawai'i Constitution was amended to
require that the governor's nominees be selected from a list provided to him from the
Judicial Selection Commission.
33 DODD, supra note 20, at 71-72, 80 n.37 (describing the make-up of the Hawai'i
Supreme Court as of 1974).
34 Cf id. at 80 n.37.
3s See id. at 48 ("This is a 'real people' court. These justices know the people of the
real world, they know how real people feel. They know especially how local people feel."
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The act of statehood thus constituted a mandate for change in the
jurisprudence of Hawai'i. Support for statehood, both among the electorate
in Hawai'i and among Congress in Washington D.C., was also support for
change. Statehood was a referendum on a broad number of changes to
political life, including a referendum on the nature of the common law of
Hawai'i.
The decisions of the Richardson Court were not sudden and radical
departures from settled law. Changes in the governance of Hawai'i, as well
as changes in the manner in which the law was interpreted, were expected as
a natural consequence of change by both those in Washington as well as in
Hawai'i.16
C. The Man: Hawaiian and Democrat
1. The ability to cross over
William S. Richardson grew up in a family that was Hawaiian and
Democrat. These were two communities that normally did not overlap.
Hawaiians and Democrats had different histories and different political
agendas. Chief Justice Richardson was unique because he bridged these
(quoting Honolulu attorney Wallace S. Fujiyama)).
36 Williamson B.C. Chang, Missing the Boat: The Ninth Circuit, Hawaiian Water
Rights and the Constitutionality ofRetroactive Overruling, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 123,
165 (1986) [hereinafter Chang, Missing the Boat].
Statehood brought major political changes to Hawaii. From the perspective of local
residents the political reasons for statehood were clear. The citizens of Hawaii held a
second class political status, having no electoral influence on their governor or the
judiciary. They could not even vote for President of the United States. Thus, along
with the desire for a popularly elected governor, one of the political motivations
behind the move for statehood was development of a judiciary more directly
representative of the population. This is a right held by the citizens of every state.
Thus, statehood promised to bring change to the racial makeup and philosophical
outlook of the state bench. Given the fact that a majority of Hawaii's citizens were
not white, a popularly elected governor would have appointed a judiciary of
undoubtedly different color and temperament than had existed in Territorial days.
Id.
37 He was a Democrat in part because of the influence of his Hawaiian grandmother.
See DODD, supra note 20, at 17.
His paternal grandmother was an active Democrat on Maui at a time when it was
neither popular nor especially wise to be one. Mary Ann Kaulaikalauele Shaw
Richardson-the same Kaula Shaw who used to be confined to the upper alcove in
lolani Palace for childish misdeeds-instilled in her son Wilfred a devotion to the
Democratic and Hawaiian causes, which she viewed as intertwined.
Id.
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two communities. Equally important, his jurisprudence would draw from
the experiences of both communities.
On one hand, his jurisprudence borrowed from Hawaiians by resurrecting
the principles and values of Hawai'i's kings and queens who reigned during
the monarchy. His jurisprudence drew on Native Hawaiian values, which
emphasized kinship and stewardship of the environment. Hawaiians knew
how to care for resources. They knew how to live on islands.
On the other hand, his jurisprudence also reflected the aspirations and
values of immigrant plantation communities and in particular borrowed from
the experience of those who made up the Democratic Party-predominantly
the Nisei, second-generation Americans of Japanese ancestry. Their
experience was one of inequality, discrimination, political ostracism, and
racism. Chief Justice Richardson could, by friendship and affiliation with
the Nisei Japanese, share these experiences. Thus, his jurisprudence
always reflected concern for the "little guy."
His experiences as both Hawaiian and Democrat blended, and two
principles emerged from the Chief Justice's membership in these two
communities. The first was a distrust and suspicion of territorial
jurisprudence. The second was his celebration of the jurisprudence of the
Kingdom of Hawai'i.39  The Chief Justice combined these two principles to
formulate a jurisprudence that was restorative, unifying, and island-based.4 0
As chief justice, Richardson would effectively blend his membership in
both communities. On one hand, he was able to convince the
Japanese-American and other immigrant communities of the value of
resurrecting and living by traditional Hawaiian principles. The Chief
Justice knew, by background and ancestry, the customs, practices, and
principles of the old Hawaiian legal ways. He could draw on knowledge
gleaned from generations of Hawaiians and thus do what no Nisei could:
speak authentically about Hawaiian historical practices and traditions that
should be incorporated into the law.
On the other hand, as a Democrat, Richardson was a bridge to the
Hawaiian community. It was difficult for many Hawaiians to accept the
Democratic Party because an important part of the Democratic platform was
the acceptance of statehood. Statehood was one further step away from the
restoration of sovereignty and independence.
Unlike many Hawaiians, William S. Richardson believed in the United
States. 41 Whatever wrongs had occurred (and he agreed that there were
38 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 667-68 n.25, 658 P.2d 287, 306 n.25 (1982).
39 See HAw. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (2009).
4 The territorial era was, in a sense, the "dark age" of Hawaiian law. The Kingdom was
the "golden age" of Hawaiian custom, usage, and precedent.
41 William S. Richardson served, after all, as Lieutenant Governor of the State of
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wrongs), the United States now had jurisdiction over Hawai'i. That was, to
Richardson, political fact. His acceptance of United States jurisdiction
over Hawai'i was more than just practical politics, however. He sincerely
believed in the promise of the American Constitution. It was this belief in
America that Richardson brought to Hawaiians as a Democrat. In a sense,
he was like the Japanese-Americans. Like the Nisei, whose parents had
immigrated to Hawai'i and the United States, Richardson had decided to
cast his lot with the United States. He had voluntarily embraced America.
He was an American by consent while some Hawaiians still viewed
themselves as Americans by conquest.
The value of Richardson to the Democratic Party was his belief in
America. If there was to be sovereignty for Hawaiians, it would be within
the rubric of the United States Constitution. When asked about Hawaiian
independence and the return of the monarchy, he would reply:
We cannot go back that far. Too many generations have gone by. Can you
think of my not being an American anymore, you know, and that's
unthinkable. Cannot do it. I think [Native Hawaiians] have to live within
the system. The American system is a good system that can cope with these
things.42
Thus, on one hand, he was the Hawaiian who could, with experience,
integrity, and knowledge, convince the Japanese-Americans and other
groups of the value of Hawaiian ways. On the other hand, he was the
Democrat who sought to convince Hawaiians that some kind of sovereignty
could be resurrected and recreated within an American framework.
2. Diferent communities: Hawaiian and Japanese
In order to understand William S. Richardson, one must understand the
differences between Democrats and Hawaiians. At statehood, few
Hawaiians were members of the Democratic Party. Hawaiians were largely
Republican.43 The haole (Caucasian) elite that had dispossessed Hawaiians
Hawai'i between 1963 and 1966. See, e.g., Vorsino & Kobayashi, supra note 1. He had
therefore sworn allegiance to the United States.
42 Richardson Interview, supra note 27.
43 FUCHS, supra note 30, at 182.
The skillful juggling of the haole-Hawaiian alliance and the influence of the plantation
vote enabled the oligarchy to maintain its control for nearly four decades, despite the
imposition of universal citizen suffrage by Congress in the Organic Act. Helping
sustain the Oligarchy during difficult periods was the weakness of the Democratic
party of Hawaii-a weakness stemming from two sources.
Id.
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had, through various alliances," enticed them into the Republican Party.4 5
Hawaiians were taught to be suspicious of the numerically superior
46
Japanese. Moreover, different experiences divided the Hawaiians from
immigrant communities like the Japanese-Americans.47
On one hand, the Japanese-Americans and other immigrant groups
thought not of sovereignty and self-determination but of survival and
acculturation in a new land.48  Japanese-Americans and Filipino-Americans
who made up the Democratic families were the sons and daughters of
first-generation immigrants who had left homelands in Japan and the
Philippines for the United States. Now that they had chosen to stay, the
Nisei, like other immigrants, wanted, above all, the privileges and rights of
" Id. at 161. On the haole-Hawaiian Republican coalition, Fuchs writes:
Throughout the Territory as a whole, the Home Rulers undoubtedly won a majority of
the Hawaiian votes. But a minority of Hawaiians combined with the near-monolithic
strength of haoles and Portuguese, was enough to change the balance of power and to
keep it in favor of the GOP for the next several years.
Id. at 160-61.
45 Id. at 162. Fuchs describes how the haole-Hawaiian Republican coalition was held
together:
Outright bribery was probably less important than promises of jobs in winning native
support for Republican candidates. According to old-timers who were part of the
inner circle of Hawaiian and haole leaders in the Republican party, key jobs on some
ranches and most plantations could not be held without dedicated service in the
Republican cause. Government jobs also bound thousands of Hawaiians to the
G.O.P. A political scientist discovered that in 1927 Hawaiians held 46 per cent of
the appointive executive positions, 55 per cent of the clerical and other government
jobs in the Territory, and more than half of the judgeships and elective offices.
Certain categories of government service, such as local law enforcement, were
virtually turned over to the Hawaiians by the oligarchy. An investigation of law
enforcement in Hawaii in 1932 found the field highly influenced by "kanaka politics."
Three years later, another study showed that Hawaiians, then less than 15 per cent of
the population, held almost a third of the public-service jobs in the Islands.
Id.
46 Id. at 159. Regarding this suspicion of the Japanese, Fuchs notes:
Kuhio had only to look around to realize that the Hawaiians should join the haoles to
protect themselves against the rising Oriental tide. There would come a day, Kuhio
was probably warned, when the Japanese who already outnumbered Hawaiians and
haoles combined would inundate the politics of the islands and Kuhio had best be
prepared.
Id.
47 See TOM CoFFMAN, THE IsLAND EDGE OF AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
HAwAl'I 178 (2003) ("For deeply rooted reasons, Japanese Americans supported statehood
more actively than any other group. Initially, the unique identity of native Hawaiians
seemed to be further obscured by statehood.").
48 See BOYLAN & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 305.
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American citizenship-they wanted to be American. They wanted to be
treated as equals.
On the other hand, many Native Hawaiians longed for monarchy and
independence. Many Native Hawaiians were not willing Americans, not
Americans by consent. Hawaiians had not come to the United States from
a foreign land; instead, the United States had come to Hawai'i. The United
States had annexed the Hawaiian Islands over the objection of the vast
majority of Hawaiians. Few Hawaiians accepted American citizenship
without some sense of ambivalence or resentment. Put bluntly, the
difference between Hawaiians and immigrant communities in Hawai'i was
as to the manner in which they had become Americans. It was the
difference between being an American by conquest and an American by
consent.49
Americans of Japanese ancestry and other immigrants to Hawai'i were, of
course, free to reinvent themselves, confident that the ways of their
homeland, its culture, language, food and ethos were being preserved back
in their home country. They could be American without fear of the loss of
language or culture. Hawaiians, on the other hand, did not have a
homeland outside of the islands, which were now a part of America. For
Hawaiians, theirs was the daily task of ensuring the survival of language,
custom, and culture. As America became a bigger part of their lives, being
Hawaiian became a smaller part. Hawaiians assimilated at the risk of
losing their Hawaiianness, which is what made sovereignty such an
important political aspiration.
3. William S. Richardson: A Hawaiian
First and foremost, William Shaw Richardson was Hawaiian. As a
Hawaiian from a family with deep ties to both the monarchy and Hawaiians
who were members of the legal profession, the Chief Justice grew up
knowing and observing the operation of the legal system. He observed the
manner by which Western lawyers and judges misinterpreted Hawaiian
customs and practice-mistaking kahu, or stewardship, for ownership.o
As a Hawaiian, Richardson knew the power of the law in molding and
shaping society. What Hawaiians know about the law is not evident to
others:
The system by which the Hawaiian understood the world and ordered their
daily lives was interpreted by outsiders to their detriment. In time, this
49 See Williamson B.C. Chang, The Wasteland in the Western Exploitation of Race and
the Environment, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 849, 860-69 (1996) [hereinafter Chang, Wasteland].
5 Cf Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 547-48, 656 P.2d 57, 68 (1982).
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outside interpretation gained authority as a series of extraordinary political,
social[,] and economic events in Hawai'i placed outsiders in a position to
make conclusive assumptions about the Hawaiian. Simply thinking and
acting as a Hawaiian accelerated the downfall. An inability to reject the
West, as the West becomes a larger and larger part of one's life, renders the
individual vulnerable. Not understanding how one's own actions are
interpreted, one faces a choice between a loyalty to one's own culture at an
unknown cost or meaningless imitation of Western forms at the cost of
alienation from one's own self. Unexpected consequences befall ordinary
Hawaiian actions and experiences: lands are lost, paper and "title" supplant
traditional duties and responsibilities. . . . An effective and real Hawaiian
order centered on a Hawaiian cosmology chaotic to Westerners is now
displaced by a Western order chaotic to Hawaiians. Westerners come to feel
at home in Hawai'i, while Hawaiians come to feel lost.
Central to the Western order is its centuries-old Eurocentric legal system.
Hawaiians act as Hawaiians at their peril, since Hawaiian actions will have
unintended meanings when evaluated in terms of the Western model. The
"reasonable man," in short, does not act like a Hawaiian. As the Western
model becomes the consequential model one eventually cannot afford to act as
a Hawaiian, since the Western (and only operational) legal system in Hawai'i
penalizes "unreasonable men."
One may still sense that one is a Hawaiian and have Hawaiian thoughts and
emotions, but since one's intuitive actions will be evaluated incomprehensibly,
action itself is discouraged. One is then chastised for laziness. That is, a
rational strategy for avoiding danger and pilikia is perceived as indolence.
When Westerners serving as Her Majesty's Cabinet members (i.e., Hawaiian
subjects engaging in treason) plotted to overthrow the monarchy, Hawaiians
were instructed by Queen Liliuokalani not to resist; she urged them to have
faith in the U.S. government. A responsible government would never ratify
this violation of international law by its pied noirs. The subsequent
submission of Hawaiian militants to the will of their ruler would ultimately
appear to have been submission to the annexation of Hawai'i by the United
States, i.e., to the disappearance of Hawai'i as a country off the face of the
earth."
Richardson had seen how Western judges had misconstrued the Hawaiian
ahupua'a system and the power of the konohiki. Westerners had observed
the konohiki, or the lesser chief of the ahupua'a, direct the tenants when to
close and open gates, when to allow water to run, and when to stop it with
barriers. Judicial decisions from the territorial period tied the power of the
51 Williamson B.C. Chang, Law and the Reconstruction of Communal Property Values
1-3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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konohiki of water to his or her ownership of the lands on which the waters
arose.52
Such interpretations were self-serving, often inuring to the benefit of the
Westerners. In traditional Hawaiian society, the konohiki did not own the
waters but rather was an administrative agent representing the ali'i (who was
simply a kahu-a steward or trustee-of the waters).ss
Western concepts by which water could be owned and transferred far
from its original source had disastrous consequences for Hawaiians.
Windward waters were diverted to the hot leeward side of the island, never
to be returned. Taro, which depended on the constant flow of water,
suffered from the lack of water. Long irrigation systems diverted water to
the leeward plains for sugar plantations and taro cultivation. That water
could never be returned. The taro plants on the windward side rotted and
died. The Hawaiian communities that were built around the cultivation of
taro were forced to relocate.
There was no ownership of water in traditional Hawai'i. Western
interpretations of Hawaiian practices, however, became Western
misinterpretations, and often those misinterpretations were deliberate.
These early lessons in legal history would influence Chief Justice
Richardson's later jurisprudence.
In the most important of his decisions, the Chief Justice ruled that the
surface waters of Hawai'i were not private property owned by those who
purchased certain parcels of land.54 He held that the surface waters of
Hawai'i were under a public trust and that the State as trustee held the
waters for the people of Hawai'i.ss
4. William S. Richardson: A Democrat
The Democratic Party was comprised mostly of Americans of Japanese
ancestry, who were the political power behind the Party. William S.
Richardson was essentially an honorary Nisei who understood well the
plantation experience, the significance of the internment of thousands of
Japanese Americans, and the challenges of World War II. He understood
what was unfair and oppressive about territorial Hawai'i.
Chief Justice Richardson shared the experience of discriminatory
treatment during the territorial period. He was not one of the elite, landed
Hawaiians who socialized with the Caucasian missionary families. As did
52 See Reppun, 65 Haw. at 547-48, 656 P.2d at 68-69.
5 MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL H. ELBERT, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 113 (rev. ed.
1986).
54 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 541, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
55 id.
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Nisei and other immigrant groups, he lived and experienced the social and
class biases of the territorial period.56  If the restoration of Hawaiian law
was the first key tenet of the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson, the
second key tenet of his jurisprudence was disgust with the unfairness of
territorial Hawai'i.
This distaste with the colonialism of the Territory of Hawai'i would lead
Chief Justice Richardson to a key principle of his jurisprudence: territorial
precedent was not really "Hawaiian" precedent for the purposes of the law.
Hawai'i, during the territorial period, had been captured by the federal
government. Federal judges that ruled in Hawai'i during the territorial
period did not apply Hawai'i law. Thus, he would write in his most
important decision, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, that the common law established
during the territorial period was not equal to the common law of Hawai'i
before and after this period.57
56 Hawai'i State Senator Clayton Hee related an anecdote about the chief justice which
demonstrates the importance of background experiences and upbringing:
Chief Justice Richardson often told the story of when, as a curious youngster, he found
himself peering over the hedges from the shore at a grand party going on inside the
Royal Hawaiian Hotel at Waikiki. He reminded us that a worker of the hotel
instructed him, that he, Richardson, needed to watch the ongoing party from "in the
water," as the beach was "private property." He said he never forgot the humiliation
as a young Hawaiian being told that the beach was private property which he said gave
rise to the ruling by the Hawai'i Supreme Court regarding the rights of access of all
people that the beach, up to (at the time) the high water mark belonged to the public.
5 See Robinson, 65 Haw. at 667-68 n.25, 658 P.2d at 306 n.25. This position was
later criticized by Judge Pence in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Haw. 1987):
In the quotation from Robinson II, supra, is to be found note 25. That note typifies
the frantic search on the part of the Richardson Court to justify its sudden reversal of
settled law. Because the rights of the konohiki as to surplus water were first decided
during the Monarchy and the Republic, and after 1897 by judges and justices of the
Territorial Supreme Court appointed by the President of the United States, therefore,
said the Answers, all those opinions "were not the product of local judiciary,"
therefore, "we doubt whether those essentially federal courts could be said to have
definitively established the common law of what is now a state ... And it is from our
authority as a state that our present common law springs." Pure chauvinistic
sophistry! The Richardson Court would hold for naught the Constitution of the State
of Hawaii[.]"
Id. at 1019 n.35 (emphasis in original).
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III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARDSON: LAWMAKING
AS A TRUST
A. Lawmaking as a Political Trust
While Chief Justice Richardson may have been the right person with the
right tool at the right moment, these factors alone did not make him
celebrated. These factors only meant that he and Hawai'i were blessed
with good fortune. The Chief Justice still had to forge his jurisprudence.
What would be the principles that underlay his jurisprudence? The Chief
Justice himself provides the best description:
Hawai'i has a unique legal system, a system of laws that was originally built
on an ancient and traditional culture. While that ancient culture had largely
been displaced, nevertheless many of the underlying guiding principles
remained.
During the years after the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893
and through Hawaii's territorial period, the decisions of our highest court
reflected a primarily Western orientation and sensibility that wasn't a
comfortable fit with Hawaii's indigenous people and its immigrant population.
We set about returning control of interpreting the law to those with deep roots
in and profound love for Hawaii. The result can be found in the decisions of
our Supreme Court beginning after Statehood. Thus, we made a conscious
effort to look to Hawaiian custom and tradition in deciding our cases-and
consistent with Hawaiian practice, our court held that the beaches were free to
all, that access to the mountains and shoreline must be rovided to the people
and that water resources could not be privately owned.
The principle that underlay his jurisprudence was political and Hawaiian.
It is best expressed in the state motto: "the life of the land 9 is
perpetuated in righteousness.,, 0 The exercise of governance must be
"pono," or righteous.6 1 Similarly, that philosophy guided lawmaking, for it
58 Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie & Aviam Soifer, Introduction to KA LAMA KO 0 KA
No'EAU: THE STANDING TORCH OF WISDOM: SELECTED OPINIONS OF WILLIAM S.
RICHARDSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, HAWAI'I SUPREME COURT, 1966-1982, at vi-vii (2009).
5 The 'dina is related to the people. See Chang, Wasteland, supra note 49; MARTHA
WARREN BECKWITH, THE KUMUiuPo: A HAWAIIAN CREATION CHANT (1951); LILIKALA
KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LANDS AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO A? 24-25
(1992).
60 See HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 5; see also RALPH KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN
KINGDOM 1778-1854: FOUNDATION AND TRANSFORMATION 220 (1938) (describing the
origins of the motto as arising from the restoration and return of the sovereignty of the
Kingdom of Hawai'i by the British upon the wrongful taking by Lord George Paulet).
61 PUKUI & ELBERT, supra note 53, at 340-41.
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was equally true that the life of the law6 2 is perpetuated in righteousness.
For lawmaking to be just, it must be derived from a harmonious relationship
between the government and the governed.6 3 The power to make law is a
power held in trust for the people. If government is not representative of
the people, then law is not righteous. Chief Justice Richardson would use
this concept of righteousness and representative government to rewrite the
property law of Hawai'i.6
In doing so, Chief Justice Richardson recognized that references to
caselaw in Hawai'i were misleading because the body of law represented
separate political regimes.65  There are five political periods in Hawaiian
history: (1) The Kingdom of Hawai'i, 1840-1893," (2) the Provisional
Government, which came to power by overthrow, 1893-1894,67 (3) the
Republic of Hawai'i, which was an extension of the Provisional Government
and was a Republic in name only, 1894-1898,8 (4) the Territory of
62 The Chief Justice believed that law must evolve. The law was alive. Law must
change. The master rule is not stability, but change. Oliver Wendell Holmes also shared
this opinion. He stated, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience....
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."
HOLMES, supra note 19, at 1; see also Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 36, at 163 ("In
the long run, the master rule of law is not stability, it is change.").
63 See KAME'ELEIHIWA,supra note 59, at 30-3 1.
In practical terms, the maka'ainana fed and clothed the Ali'i Nui, who provided the
organization required to produce enough food to sustain an ever-increasing
population. Should a maka'dinana fail to cultivate or malama his portion of the
'Aina that was grounds for dismissal. By the same token, should a konohiki fail in
proper direction of the maka'ainana, he too would be dismissed-for his own failure
to malama. The Ali'i Nui were no better off in this respect, for if any famine affected
the 'Aina they would be ousted for failing to malama their religious duties. Hence to
Mdlama 'Aina was by extension to care for the maka'dinana and the Ali'i, for in the
Hawaiian metaphor these three components are mystically one and the same.
Id.
6 The cases that rewrote property law are: In re Robinson, 49 Haw. 429, 421 P.2d 570
(1966); In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968); In re Kelley, 50 Haw. 567, 445
P.2d 538 (1968); McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973);
County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973); In re Sanborn, 57 Haw.
585, 562 P.2d 771 (1977); United Congregational Churches v. Heirs of Kamamalu, 59
Haw. 334, 582 P.2d 208 (1978); Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d
57 (1982); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982); and Kalipi v.
Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
65 Robinson, 65 Haw. at 667-68 n.25, 658 P.2d at 306 n.25.
66 See KUYKENDALL, supra note 60.
67 See WILLIAM ADAM Russ, JR., THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION (1893-94), at 69-112
(1992).
68 WILLIAM ADAM Russ, JR., THE HAwAIIAN REPUBLIC AND ITS STRUGGLE TO WIN
ANNEXATION (1894-98), at 33 (1992) ("Native Hawaiians were, perhaps, not extremely
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Hawai'i, which followed the annexation of Hawai'i by the United States,
1898-1959,69 and (5) statehood in 1959.70
Certain periods were righteous-that is, representative. Others were
not.7 Accordingly, the common law arising from the "dark" periods of
Hawai'i, the periods in which government was not representative of the
people, was not authentic, not valid, not "pono."
The Chief Justice, in footnote 25 of the Hawai'i Supreme Court's opinion
in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, pointed to the territorial period as
non-representative:
We recognize that [Hawai'i Revised Statutes] § 1-1, which was enacted during
the monarchy in 1892 and amended only once, in 1903, might be construed to
adopt territorial caselaw as among the "Hawaiian judicial precedent"
representing the common law of the State. We do not at this time, however,
address the question of whether those cases can truly be considered
"Hawaiian" rather than federal precedent for we wish only to point out that the
development of the law governing surplus water took place during a period
when the resources of our land were subject to an authority which did not
directly represent Hawaii's people and that the most recent pronouncements
on the subject arise more immediately from the authority of those who will be
forever affected by it.72
The era of the Kingdom was a golden one. The rulers of that era were
stewards of the land. The politics of the Kingdom, although a monarchy,
were essentially Hawaiian with Western labels. There was a hierarchy of
titles and positions from top to bottom. At the top was the island's ma'T,
the highest chief. At the bottom was a tenant who worked a taro lo'i. In
between these two ranks were high chiefs, lesser chiefs or konohiki, and
maka'dinana or tenants. Each was charged with the care and use of certain
parcels of land. The chiefs received the largest parcels. Lesser chiefs
received land divisions carved from the lands held by the high chiefs.
sophisticated in governmental matters, but it took no great amount of political insight to
perceive that this constitutional system was a beautifully devised oligarchy devoted to the
purpose of keeping the American minority in control of the Republic.").
69 FucHS, supra note 30; ROGER BELL, LAST AMONG EQUALS: HAWAIIAN STATEHOOD
AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1984).
70 BELL, supra note 69.
7' For a description of the harshness of plantation life and discrimination against
non-whites during the territorial period, see generally FUCHS, supra note 30; RONALD
TAKAKI, PAU HANA: PLANTATION LIFE AND LABOR IN HAWAI'I (1983); RONALD TAKAKI,
RAISING CANE: THE WORLD OF PLANTATION HAWAI't (1989); Williamson B.C. Chang,
Reversals of Fortune: The Hawai'i Supreme Court, the Memorandum Opinion and the
Realignment of Political Power in Post-Statehood Hawai'i, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 17, 22-23
n. 13 (1992) [hereinafter Chang, Reversals ofFortune].
72 65 Haw. 641, 667-68 n.25, 658 P.2d 287, 306 n.25 (1982).
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Tenants had lo'i within the units of the konohiki. No one "owned" land or
water-rather, there was a right of use with a concomitant duty or
responsibility.73
Each individual in customary Hawai'i was a kahu or steward of the land.
Thus, use of land and waters did not arise from ownership but arose from
duty or responsibility, the concept of kuleana (responsibility) and mllama
(caring). Each individual had a kuleana-the highest chiefs, the m6'i, had
the broadest kuleana-responsibility for the nation as a whole. One could
not separate favors-or rights of use--from responsibility. Lawmaking
did not stem from the autocratic power of the highest chiefs, it arose from
the concept of caring for the land, malama 'dina, and caring for the people,
milama Lahui. 75
After the Kingdom, during the post-overthrow period, Western laws were
used to reconstruct Hawaiian custom and practice. Thus began the
misinterpretations, such as the assertion that the king was the owner of all
property. As to water rights, this was false. The king held the waters in
trust. Westerners also misconstrued the nature of the konohiki's
relationship with water. Territorial precedents declared that since the king
owned the waters, the king's grants to lesser chiefs, the konohiki, conveyed
ownership of the bulk of the surface waters.
The rules that supposedly decreed private ownership of water were primarily
set out by the Territorial Supreme Court of Hawai'i. These rules were not
faithful to the way Native Hawaiians managed water prior to the coming of the
westerners . . . . Rather, the Native Hawaiians exercised water rights in a
communal manner. The Konohiki was an agent of the King. He did not
"own" the water, as later, post-annexation, Territorial precedents may have
suggested .... Rather, the Konohiki oversaw the allocation, management and
regulation of water among the taro farmers. 76
To Chief Justice Richardson, the precedent and jurisprudence of the
territorial period was not "Hawaiian"-not "pono." The elite and powerful
of the Territory, such as the sugar industry, captured the Hawai'i Supreme
Court and changed the property law of Hawai'i, particularly the law of water
rights. The Chief Justice saw his duty as returning the law to those with
"deep roots" in and a "profound love" of Hawai'i. Territorial precedent
73 See KAME'ELEIHWA,supra note 59, at 51.
74 See generally Homer v. Kumuliili, 10 Haw. 174 (1895) (describing a system of water
rights by which tenants were kahu (stewards) of the waters and lands).
7s See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 59, at 150 ("One cannot malama the 'Aina if one
does not malama the maka'dinana who work the 'Aina.").
76 Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 36, at 164 (noting that the societal background
to the rules regarding water rights in Hawai'i had completely changed by the time of the
McBryde decision).
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could be set aside. As Chief Justice Richardson wrote in Reppun v. Board
of Water Supply:
[O]ur decision [in the earlier 1973 opinion of McBryde v. Robinson] was
premised on the firm conviction that prior [territorial] courts had largely
ignored the mandates of the rulers of the Kingdom and the traditions of the
native Hawaiians in their zeal to convert these islands into a manageable
western society . . .. We cannot continue to ignore what we firmly believe
were fundamental mistakes regarding one of the most precious of our
resources. McBryde was a necessary and proper step in the rectification of
basic misconceptions concerning water "rights" in Hawaii. 77
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1 was the statutory tool by which the
Hawai'i Supreme Court could resurrect the past.78  It was designed, as of
1892, to incorporate the common law of England and the United States as
the law of the Kingdom of Hawai'i. It had important exceptions:
common law was displaced if there was conflicting Hawaiian precedent,
custom, or usage. The original section 1-1, the Judiciary Act of 1892, was
reenacted by the Territory and by the State. Today, it reads as follows:
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American
decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all
cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial
precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be
subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written laws of the
United States or the State.
For the Chief Justice, section 1-1, or the principle of "looking back" to the
laws and values of the Kingdom, was present in all of his critical property
decisions: Palama v. Sheehan,so In re Ashford, 8  County of Hawaii v.
n 65 Haw. 531, 545-48, 656 P.2d 57, 67-69 (1982).
78 For Chief Justice Richardson, Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1 was the most
important of Hawai'i's laws. On many occasions he would emphasize to his law clerks the
central importance of section 1-1. For example, Justice Robert Klein recalled, as a law
clerk for Chief Justice Richardson, being taught and reminded by the Chief Justice of section
1-1. It was the vehicle that connected jurisprudence of the State of Hawai'i with the laws,
values and customs of the Kingdom of Hawai'i. Justice Klein would use section 1-1 in the
landmark PASH decision by which he, for the court, incorporated section 7-1, as applicable
to modern property rights. See Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning
Comm'n, 79 Haw. 425, 437, 903 P.2d 1246, 1258 (1995) (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 1-1
(Supp. 1992)).
7 HAw. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (2009).
80 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968).
" 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968).
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Sotomura,82 In re Sanborn," Reppun v. Board of Water Supply,8 4 Kalipi V.
Hawaiian Trust Co.,85 and especially Robinson v. Ariyoshi.86
Chief Justice Richardson also used section 1-1 to correct the
law--disregarding decisions that arose from the "dark ages." Thus, in
footnote 25 of Robinson v. Ariyoshi, he distinguishes the territorial period as
a regime in which the people of Hawai'i were essentially
non-self-governing.87
The use of both section 1-1 and footnote 25 became extremely
controversial. Some critics sarcastically commented that footnote 25 meant
that the volumes of the Hawai'i Reports containing cases dating from 1898
to 1959 should be thrown away. Judge Pence, for example, sharply
denounced the logic of footnote 25 as "frantic" and "[p]ure chauvinistic
sophistry[.]"8 8
The jurisprudence by which the Chief Justice looked past territorial
precedent to resurrect the values and principles of the Kingdom would be
sternly challenged. Ultimately, though, that jurisprudence would succeed.
First, it would restore to Hawaiians a sense of sovereignty. Second, it
would unify both Hawaiians and the immigrant communities that had come
to work the plantations. Third, it would be a jurisprudence appropriate for
an island-based society. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, that
jurisprudence would withstand constitutional attack.
B. The Jurisprudence of Restoration
The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson was restorative in two
different senses. First, it took values and principles of the kings and queens
of Hawai'i and restored them to present law. 89  Second, it restored to
Hawaiians one attribute of sovereignty-the ability to live under one's own
laws.
The power to make laws and live under those laws is an essential element
of sovereignty. Imagine if Hawai'i had survived as an independent nation.
In such a case, the property decisions of the Hawai'i Supreme Court would
82 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973).
8 57 Haw. 585, 562 P.2d 771 (1977).
* 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 571 (1982).
" 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
16 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
87 See id. at 667-68 n.25, 658 P.2d at 306 n.25.
88 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1019 n.35 (D. Haw. 1987); see also supra
note 57.
89 See Robinson, 65 Haw. at 667, 658 P.2d at 306 (restoring the concept of publici juris
(the public trust) for surface waters).
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likely resemble the property jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson. In
other words, his property jurisprudence was the jurisprudence of Hawai'i
had it remained sovereign and independent.
C. The Jurisprudence of Unification
The jurisprudence of the Chief Justice ultimately succeeded because it
was non-discriminatory. It was unifying. It treated all communities
equally. The restoration of Hawaiian values, customs, and usage was not
for Hawaiians only. Hawaiian principles established rights for all who
reside in contemporary Hawai'i.
Chief Justice Richardson widened the beaches because that is what the
kings and queens during the monarchy would have done.90 Chief Justice
Richardson imposed a public trust applicable to all waters in the state
because that is what the kings and queens of Hawai'i would have done.91
He made that public trust applicable to all because that is what the kings and
queens under the monarchy would have done.92 If Hawai'i had remained
independent and sovereign, there would be no distinction between the rights
of Native Hawaiians and others. Much as if Hawai'i had remained
independent, the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson is a "Hawaiian,"
not a "Native Hawaiian," jurisprudence. The principle of
non-discrimination was applied to the whole of the common law, including
torts, 93 property,94 and contracts.
Nonetheless, the Chief Justice did support statutory95 and constitutional
provisions that gave Native Hawaiians special rights.96 Constitutional and
statutory provisions according Native Hawaiians specific rights were
appropriately "pono," particularly when such rights were reflective of the
political will of the people of Hawai'i or the United States. Thus, in
decisions such as Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, he
90 See cases cited supra note 4.
91 See Robinson, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287; Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 65 Haw.
531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982).
92 See id.
93 See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Kelley v. Kokua Sales &
Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 210-14, 532 P.2d 673, 677-79 (1975) (Richardson, C.J.,
dissenting).
94 See cases cited supra note 4.
9 See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-101 (1993) ("Native Hawaiian Water Rights").
96 See Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982)
(establishing a fiduciary duty on the State as to a federal program, created by statute, to
provide homestead lands to native Hawaiians).
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vigorously protected the rights of Native Hawaiians as enjoyed under federal
law. 97
D. Toward an Island-Based Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson also incorporated
principles particularly appropriate for life in an island environment.
Hawaiians had lived in the Hawaiian islands for thousands of years.
Hawaiian concepts of the 'dina reflected communal values particularly
suited to island life. During the territorial period, the imposition of
Western market-based property rules undermined communal practices.
Hawaiians understood how life on islands was different from life on
continents. Market-driven economies do not work well on islands.
Accumulation, the hoarding of goods by which the wealthy can deprive
others of access to resources, does not promote societal well-being on
islands. Rather, the ahupua'a system, by which stewardship and
sustainability of resources is emphasized, was the political norm for
traditional Hawai'i.
The importance of communal property rights and public ownership of
resources is expressed in a number of Chief Justice Richardson's property
decisions. In the shoreline cases, he expanded the public area of beaches
because in crowded island communities, access to ocean resources is critical
for sustenance, recreation, and public access. 98 Thus, his decisions
expanding public use of beaches make absolute sense for an island
community99 because that was where early Hawaiians parked their canoes in
olden days so canoes would not wash out to sea. As Chief Justice
Richardson acknowledged: "You couldn't leave your canoe on the beach
97 id.
98 See cases cited supra note 4. In the shoreline cases, Chief Justice Richardson
expanded the beaches so that the demarcation between public and private dominion was the
higher of the vegetation line or the debris line. Usually, the vegetation line is much higher
on the beach. It is where permanent vegetation begins to grow.
9 See DODD, supra note 20, at 72.
As the controversy continued, especially after the land and water decisions, Bill
Richardson would say, with a smile, in private conversations: "If I had my way, the
public would have even greater access to water and shoreline property. Hawaiian
kings, I'm sure, intended to give their subjects more public seashore lands than we
now allot. No one but a fool would leave his canoe at the vegetation line and let the
waves wash it out to sea! The kings really must have intended to extend public
property to that area on the beach where canoes could be left without danger of being
washed away.
Id.
122
2010 / THE LA WIS PERPETUATED IN RIGHTEOUSNESS
and have it [drift] out to sea at night. You must bring it far enough up.
And as far up as you needed to bring it, must have been public domain." 00
Moreover, the water rights opinions reflected the heightened importance
of fresh water resources in island societies. The privatization of surface
water rights, which occurred during the territorial period, meant that the
public was effectively excluded from decisions regarding the allocation of
water. The decisions of the Hawai'i Supreme Court during the territorial
period allocated all power to private owners, namely the large sugar
companies. A market system, as had been established during the territorial
period, affirmed the rights of sugar companies and those with money.
Water is too critical a resource to be left to market forces where one can only
hope that the laws of supply and demand will result in policy that serves the
whole community.
Hawai'i and its self-renewing water supply system can be analogized to a
spaceship traveling on a journey that will take many generations. There are
a limited supply of goods on board and a finite quantity of renewable
resources such as food and water. Which system of allocation would work
best: a system where resources are collectively pooled and distributed
according to need? Or a system based on private ownership? Private
ownership permits those who started with the resources or money to hoard
resources to the deprivation of others.'0 '
Islands are different from continents. The property law appropriate for a
continent is not compatible with small islands. The paradigm for property
rights on an island, with scarce lands, must be different from the paradigm
of property for England where estates are the norm. The legal paradigm for
Western property law is "Blackacre." The Blackacre of contemporary
Hawai'i is far different from that of common-law England:
The property law one would expect to find on a spaceship would be different
from that of seventeenth-century England. In Hawaii, one cannot expect the
property law of old England to make sense today. Nineteenth-century
English law focused on the paradigm of "Black-acre," a 25-acre (10-ha) estate
with running streams, gardens, and a 20-room mansion. With Blackacre as a
model, property law developed in a certain way. On the other hand, the para-
digm of Blackacre for Hawaii is likely to be a two-bedroom condominium in a
20-story building with 1000 residents on 3.5 acres (1.4 ha).102
Islands must be self-sustaining. Hawai'i, as an island state, cannot rely
on neighboring states; if Hawai'i residents do not have enough water, food,
100 Richardson Interview, supra note 27.
'o1 See Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 36, at 167.
102 Williamson B.C. Chang, Water Rights in the Age of Anxiety, J. AM. WATER WORKS
Ass'N, Mar. 1978, at 40-43.
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recreational space, and jobs, they cannot find substitutes in neighboring,
contiguous states. Hawai'i's electric grid cannot rely on a regional
multi-state system that would protect it from a blackout. Hawai'i, in short,
is like a spaceship, and resource rules on a spaceship must be far different
than those on a bountiful planet.
Hawaiians knew how to live on islands. They knew enough to eschew
market-driven economies for economic systems based on gifting. 103
Hawaiians knew the importance of stewardship and applied principles such
as mdlama 'dina'0 (caring for the land) and kuleana (responsibility) to
resource management. The incorporation of communal Hawaiian resource
principles has succeeded today because it is the appropriate way of living on
an island.
IV. CONFISCATION OR CORRECTION: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARDSON'S JURISPRUDENCE
The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson has its place in history
today because it survived constitutional attack. So long as a cloud hung
over those decisions, there could be no acceptance, no celebration, no
legacy.'s When the court first rendered these key decisions, there was a
storm of controversy. Critics did not see them as restorative, unifying, and
island-based, but condemned them as confiscatory.106  The losing parties in
these cases, including McBryde v. Robinson, 107 County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura,08 and State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring,'09 would all sue in
federal court seeking enforcement of vested rights that were based on
territorial common law. This part provides a history of the constitutional
litigation in the most important of those cases, McBryde v. Robinson.
103 JOCELYN LINNEKIN, CHILDREN OF THE LAND: EXCHANGE AND STATUS IN A HAWAIIAN
COMMUNITY (1985).
10 See generally KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 59.
105 Typical of such opinion was the opinion of A.A. Smyser, long the editor of the
Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Smyser objected to the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson.
To him, it was destabilizing. Only when the constitutional controversy was over did
Smyser grudgingly accept the decision in Robinson v. Ariyoshi.
' See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1019 (D. Haw. 1987).
107 McBryde v. Robinson was challenged in federal court as Robinson v. Ariyoshi. See
cases cited supra note 9.
108 See Sotomura v. Cnty. of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978).
10 See Zimring v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Haw. 1979).
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1. McBryde v. Robinson: The original action"t0
McBryde v. Robinson'' was a quiet title action by which two sugar
companies sought to settle ownership of the surface water rights of the
Hanapape River on Kaua'i.112 Both sugar companies claimed ownership of
the bulk of the surface waters of the rivers. Under prior law, the Territorial
Supreme Court had ruled that the ownership of waters was vested in the
ownership of lands on which such surface waters originated."' Surface
waters were private property and could be used as the owner of such waters
pleased. The trial court in McBryde divided the waters between the
competing claimants, and all was quiet until the Hawai'i Supreme Court
ruled on appeal.
On appeal, Justice Abe, writing for the court, overturned the law
establishing private ownership of surface waters and held that the waters
were owned by the State of Hawai'i. The sugar companies were shocked
as the decision divested both parties of all ownership rights. None of the
parties, even the State, had urged such a result. All parties sought
rehearing before the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
The sugar companies alleged that Justice Abe's decision resulted in a
taking of their property without just compensation because prior to the
decision they had water rights, and after the decision they had none.
Surely, they argued, this was as much of a taking as if the State had actually
condemned their rights, which would require the State to pay just
110 McBryde v. Robinson, a 1973 decision adjudicating water rights on the island of
Kaua'i, was actually written by Justice Kazuhisa Abe. Nonetheless, the McBryde decision
is today so closely associated with Chief Justice Richardson that it is treated here as part of
his body of work. Although he did not author the decision, Chief Justice Richardson
clearly concurred in the result and the reasoning of Justice Abe. When the decision was
collaterally attacked in federal district court, the Chief Justice, under his authority as Chief
Administrator of the Hawai'i Judiciary, actively became involved in defending the decision.
Most important, when the Ninth Circuit directed certified questions to the Hawai'i
Supreme Court to answer, the response was written by Chief Justice Richardson. Those
answers, reported in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, constitute the most important decision of the
Chief Justice's body of work. Thus, McBryde v. Robinson, which the chief justice did not
author, and Robinson v. Ariyoshi, which he did, are both treated as part of the core of his
jurisprudence.
" 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (Abe, J.), aff'd on reh'g, 55 Haw. 260, 517 P.2d 26
(1973) (per curiam).
112 See Chang, Unraveling, supra note 21, at 61 (footnotes omitted) ("McBryde is the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision culminating some twenty years of litigation regarding the
extent to which various parties have rights to the water in the Hanapepe River. The parties
involved were the State of Hawaii and the various landowners whose property adjoined the
river and streams.").
113 See cases cited supra note 26.
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compensation. The sugar companies also alleged a violation of procedural
due process and claimed that their property had been taken without a proper
hearing.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court granted a rehearing but limited the issues:
the takings and procedural due process claims could not be argued.l14  The
only issue that would be reheard would be as to whether Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 7-1,11s a law from the Kingdom of Hawai'i, had been
applied correctly.1 6  The Hawai'i Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision
of Justice Abe."17
Significantly, however, Justice Levinson joined Justice Marumoto in
dissent. Levinson wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing passionately that the
sugar companies had vested water rights." 8  Levinson was the first to
articulate the theory that the Hawai'i Supreme Court, by its very decision,
had taken the property of the sugar companies without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. "9 The losing parties sought review in the United States
114 McBryde, 55 Haw. at 261, 517 P.2d at 27.
115 HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2009).
116 McBryde, 55 Haw. at 261, 517 P.2d at 27.
" Id., 55 Haw. 260, 527 P.2d 26 (per curiam), af'g 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (Abe,
J.) (1973). Judge Pence was later to call this rehearing "farcical." Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
441 F. Supp 559, 580 (D. Haw. 1977).
Thereafter on the almost farcical "rehearing", although the due process issues were
urged by the plaintiffs, the court refused to permit argument thereon or consider the
same. Rather, the court extended a clearly pro forma invitation to the plaintiffs "to
prove to us why we were wrong" on issues and conclusions assumed sua sponte by the
court. On this basis alone the judgment of the court would have to be declared void,
for if permitted to remain in full force and effect, plaintiffs have been deprived of
property rights without ever having had a fair and meaningful opportunity to defend
against their being handed over to the state on a silver platter without even a request
by the State for the gift.
Id.
.1. McBryde, 55 Haw. at 262-304, 517 P.2d at 27-51 (Levinson, J., dissenting).
119 Justice Levinson quoted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v.
Washington:
For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking
property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that
the property it has taken never existed at all. Whether the decision here worked an
unpredictable change in state law thus inevitably presents a federal question for the
determination of this Court. Id. at 302, 517 P.2d at 50 (quoting Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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Supreme Court, making the same arguments. 120 The United States
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal. 12 1
In an innovative move, the two sugar companies joined forces and
together, as plaintiffs, sued the State of Hawai'i in federal district court,
alleging that the State, through the Hawai'i Supreme Court, had taken their
property without just compensation. 12 2  In 1977, Judge Martin Pence ruled
in favor of the sugar companies, enjoining the enforcement of the Hawai'i
Supreme Court decision.' 23  Judge Pence was extremely harsh in his
criticism of the Hawai'i Supreme Court:12 4  Pence said the ruling was
"strictly a 'public-policy' decision with no prior underlying 'legal'
justification" 25 and called it "one of the grossest examples of unfettered
judicial construction used to achieve the result desired-regardless of its
effect upon the parties, or the state of the prior law on the subject."l 2 6
Judge Pence's ruling enjoined state officials from acting to enforce the
McBryde decision and essentially "reversed" the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Richardson understood the implications. Although the
named defendants were the Governor of the State of Hawai'i and the
members of the Board of Land and Natural Resources, the real defendant
was the Hawai'i Supreme Court. Here, contemplated Chief Justice
Richardson, a federal district court, the lowest court in the federal system,
had reversed a state supreme court, the highest court of the state system.127
If a federal district court could set aside a judgment of the Hawai'i Supreme
Court whenever the Hawai'i Supreme Court overturned prior law, then
federal trial courts would be, in fact, the highest court of the state system.
Richardson firmly believed that the Hawai'i Supreme Court had acted
constitutionally. A state supreme court has the power and right to correct
120 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974) (dismissing appeal and
denying certiorari); Robinson v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 974 (1974) (denying certiorari).
121 id.
122 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977). See also cases cited supra
note 9.
123 Robinson, 441 F. Supp. 559.
124 Id. at 583 ("McBryde I therefore came as a shocking, violent deviation from the
solidly established case law, totally unexpected and impossible to have been anticipated. It
was a radical departure from prior decisions.").
125 Id. at 566; see also id. at 585 ("It may be that the court did not conceive its action as a
taking-it said the plaintiffs never had had any such water rights, ergo, no taking! Just that
simple! The Constitution does not measure the taking of property by what a court may say
or even what it may intend; the measure is by the result.").
126 Id. at 568; see also Chang, Reversals ofFortune, supra note 71, at 28-29 n.3 1.
127 Richardson Interview, supra note 27 ("And I felt that the highest court of a state
should be higher than the lowest court in the federal system.").
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the law of its state. The Hawai'i Supreme Court was sovereign over state
law.
The whole of the property jurisprudence of the Chief Justice hung in the
balance. Each of his landmark cases-Sheehan, Ashford, Sotomura,
Sanborn, Zimring, Reppun, and Kalipi-all overruled intervening law in
some fashion. Each could similarly be collaterally attacked as a taking of
property. If the federal district courts could enjoin the enforcement of these
decisions, then the Chief Justice's judicial transformation of the property
law of Hawai'i would be stopped in its tracks. Moreover, the
independence and sovereignty of the Hawai'i Judiciary would be subservient
to the federal district courts.
The named state defendants, including the Governor, appealed Judge
Pence's ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chief Justice
Richardson, however, believed that the Hawai'i Supreme Court and the
Hawai'i Judiciary had an interest separate from the individuals named as
state defendants. As such, Chief Justice Richardson himself sought to be
heard in the appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Thus, as Chief Administrator
of the Hawai'i Judiciary, Chief Justice Richardson retained the author of this
article as a Special Deputy Attorney General to represent the Hawai'i State
Judiciary in federal court.12 8
Chief Justice Richardson's fears were correct: the federal district court's
injunction in Robinson v. Ariyoshi led others to attack state supreme court
judgments that allegedly took property when overturning prior law. The
Sotomuras, for example, who had lost beachfront land when the Hawai'i
Supreme Court reduced their beach frontage, sued in federal district court.12 9
The Zinrings also sued after they lost land they claimed by volcanic
accretion. 130 This was a precarious moment for the Hawai'i Supreme
Court. Its independence, sovereignty, and ability to elevate Hawaiian
principles above Western property concepts, were all on trial.
This author and others represented the State in all three actions. The
State defendants and Chief Justice Richardson argued that the federal district
courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the property decisions of the Hawai'i
Supreme Court. If federal district courts could enjoin state supreme courts,
128 The Chief Justice thought it critical that he retain his own counsel because the attack
on McBryde was sure to lead to other attacks on his jurisprudence. He was correct. See
supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 108.
130 See supra note 109. The attacks on McBryde, Sotomura, and Zimring all raised the
same issue: did the Hawai'i Supreme Court, in implementing the jurisprudence of the
Kingdom over that of the Territory, "take" the property of the plaintiffs in violation of the
United States Constitution? The author was also retained as counsel in the Sotomura and
Zimring federal cases.
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then state supreme courts were no longer sovereign as to matters of property
law. This author argued that if losing parties were allowed to re-file an
original action and sue on the basis of a judicial taking, there would be no
finality in the legal system.
This author also asserted that there was no such cause of action as a
judicial taking; courts do not take property when they declare winners and
losers. A state supreme court, when rendering a decision, does not take
from one party and give to another; it adjudicates the rights of parties. If a
court is deemed to have taken property every time it rules on a case, then
every ruling is a judicial taking because there is a losing party in every case.
Nonetheless, the sugar companies, the parties that had allegedly lost
vested rights, had a simple yet powerful argument: before McBryde, they
had water rights, and after McBryde, they had no water rights-ipso facto,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court had taken the water rights of the sugar
companies. The economic ramifications of such a decision were huge
because all sugar companies in the state relied on private ownership of
surface waters for irrigation. The two sugar companies, now joined by
other sugar companies from around the state, launched extraordinary efforts
into the fight that reflected the large stakes involved. For example, the
sugar companies retained the former dean of Harvard Law School, Solicitor
General Erwin Griswold, as co-counsel. 131 They brought disciplinary
charges alleging that this author had violated the canons of ethics for
publishing law review articles on related issues. 132  Attorneys for the sugar
industry even sought to stifle this author's publications and succeeded in
blocking the publication of one article in the Hawaii Bar Journal.133
The case was destined for the United States Supreme Court. As counsel
for Chief Justice Richardson and the Hawai'i State Judiciary, this author
feared the result there. The sugar companies had, in practical terms, a very
strong case. Their arguments were visceral while the judiciary's defenses
were academic and theoretical.
It was clear that this author could not afford to risk winning or losing
before the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court on the
theoretical grounds that courts simply could not "take" property. 134  There
was a strong chance that the United States Supreme Court would follow the
1' See, e.g., Reply Memorandum for the Appellants and Petitioners, McBryde Sugar Co.
v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974) (No. 73-1440).
132 See Chang, Reversals ofFortune, supra note 71, at 48-49 n.69.
13 See id.
134 The United States Supreme Court had looked at the issue from various viewpoints and
had never ruled on whether courts can take property. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263
U.S. 444 (1924); Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 (1920); Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454 (1907); Cent. Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895).
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concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in Hughes v. Washington: "For a
state cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting
retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all."'s
But this was a case of first impression and the Supreme Court would
probably want to avoid the takings question. In all its history, the United
States Supreme Court had never ruled that a state supreme court, in
overturning or overruling prior law, had "taken" property in violation of the
Constitution.
For, if a state supreme court that overturned prior law could be charged
with taking property, the same could be said of the United States Supreme
Court when it overturned prior precedent. Yet, how could the United
States Supreme Court, in rendering a decision, be guilty of taking property?
The Supreme Court would likely do everything possible to avoid the
substantive issue-avoid having to rule on the question of whether courts
could take property when overruling prior law. Thus, the Ninth Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court needed some other way out-some other
issue by which to rule in favor of the Hawai'i Supreme Court. In short, this
author sought a basis by which to win without exposing the Hawai'i
Supreme Court and the jurisprudence of Richardson to an all-or-nothing
result.
The answer lay in the Chief Justice's own jurisprudence and his own view
that Western concepts of ownership had misinterpreted the trust principle by
which Hawai'i's kings and queens held the waters of Hawai'i. The whole
claim that the Hawai'i Supreme Court had taken the property of the sugar
companies rested on a single assumption: that water could be owned in a
corporeal sense. Yet, this was not the Hawaiian view of water. Under the
Hawaiian view, no one could "own" water. Thus, no one could "take"
water. When Justice Abe in McBryde v. Robinson awarded the State
"ownership" of the surface waters of the stream, all parties had interpreted
the term "ownership" in its Western sense, in the sense used by the
Territorial Supreme Court. 136 However, Justice Abe did not mean
ownership in a corporeal sense. Justice Abe carefully intimated that water
under English common law could not be owned; rather, it was held as
publici juris-a public trust.13 7
135 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
136 See Chang, Unraveling, supra note 21, at 86-87.
13 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 187, 504 P.2d 1330, 1339 (1973)
("It appears that this Act was very similar to the English common law rules which had
evolved by that time that no one may acquire property to running water in a natural water
course; that flowing water was publici juris; and that it was common property to be used by
all who had a right of access to it, as usufruct of the water course.").
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Moreover, Chief Justice Richardson believed, as did the Hawaiians during
the time of the Kingdom, that "ownership" was how Westerners
mischaracterized the king's relationship with the lands and waters of
Hawai'i.'3 8  The king was not the owner of the waters of Hawai'i-he was
its trustee. Ownership was not righteous. Trusteeship was righteous.
Trusteeship recognized both the beneficiaries' interest in the waters and the
fiduciary duty of the trustee to the beneficiaries.13 9
Thus, this author raised in oral argument before the Ninth Circuit the
possibility that there was a misunderstanding in the use of the term
"ownership." The sugar companies used "ownership" to mean ownership
and possession of the water in a real, corporeal sense. Suppose, this author
asked, the Hawai'i Supreme Court did not use "ownership" in that sense but
rather used the term "ownership" as it was used in all jurisdictions outside of
Hawai'i-as publici juris. Suppose the Hawai'i Supreme Court meant to
merely give the State a public trust over the surface waters. If the latter
were true, then there was no taking of property. The assertion of the public
trust was akin to an assertion of a police power over the waters. The State
always had a police power over its resources; thus, a decision establishing
state police power over the surface waters of Hawai'i did not give the State
something it did not already have, and no taking had occurred.
This author argued that if there was ambiguity about state law, then the
Ninth Circuit should certify questions to the Hawai'i Supreme Court for
clarification.14 0  The sugar companies were of course reluctant to return to
the very court they were suing; nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit ordered
certification. Once back in the Hawai'i Supreme Court, the sugar
138 See Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 545, 548, 656 P.2d 57, 67, 69
(1982) (citations omitted) ("In McBryde ... our decision there was premised on the firm
conviction that prior courts had largely ignored the mandates of the rulers of the Kingdom
and the traditions of the native Hawaiians in their zeal to convert these islands into a
manageable western society .... We cannot continue to ignore what we firmly believe were
fundamental mistakes regarding one of the most precious of our resources. McBryde was a
necessary and proper step in the rectification of basic misconceptions concerning water
'rights' in Hawaii.").
139 Chief Justice Richardson was to make clear that the use of the term "ownership" was
not meant to refer to ownership in a corporeal sense. This was clearly stated in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 674, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (1982) ("This is not ownership in the
corporeal sense where the State may do with the property as it pleases; rather, we
comprehend the nature of such authority to assure the continued existence and beneficial
application of the resource for the common good.").
140 See HAw. R. APP. P. 13(a) ("When a federal district or appellate court certifies to the
Hawai'i Supreme Court that there is involved in any proceeding before it a question
concerning the law of Hawai'i that is determinative of the cause and that there is no clear,
controlling precedent in the Hawai'i judicial decisions, the Hawai'i Supreme Court may
answer the certified question by written opinion.").
13 1
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companies moved to recuse Chief Justice Richardson.141 The Hawai'i
Supreme Court denied that motion. 142
The question of "ownership" was certified, as one of six questions, to the
Hawai'i Supreme Court.14 3  After lengthy briefing and hearings on the
questions, Chief Justice Richardson's answer was clear: corporeal
ownership of water was never a Hawaiian concept. '" Thus, "state
ownership" as was awarded to the State by the McBryde decision merely
meant that the State had a public trust, not ownership in a corporeal sense.
Chief Justice Richardson's opinion on the certified questions would be the
finest of his legacy. It also provided the basis by which to win before the
United States Supreme Court.
If the Hawai'i Supreme Court had merely awarded the State a public trust
over the waters and not corporeal ownership, there was no "taking," for
nothing had been given to the State of Hawai'i.145  If nothing had been
(judicially) taken, and no action had been taken to enforce the McBryde
141 Motion to Recuse the Honorable William S. Richardson at 7, Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (No. 8241) ("As detailed herein and in the affidavit
submitted herewith the Honorable William S. Richardson appeared as amicus curiae in the
Ninth Circuit proceedings in this case. The appellees by their attorneys respectfully submit
that Chief Justice Richardson is under a duty to recuse himself from participating in this
Court's proceedings on the certified questions.").
142 See Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65
Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (No. 8241) ("The questions asked by the Ninth Circuit
relate in part to the interpretation of a 1973 decision by this court in which the Chief Justice
participated. It would seem appropriate for him to continue to sit in the instant proceeding
to assist in giving the Ninth Circuit meaningful answers to questions which they have asked
this court to answer. If he were to recuse himself, that would seem to undermine or
partially frustrate the purposes of the certification by the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, under
the circumstances of this proceeding, we find insufficient grounds for recusal of the Chief
Justice.").
143 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 647, 658 P.2d 287, 294 (1982) (listing the
certified questions).
'4 Id. at 667, 658 P.2d at 306.
A part of Hawaii's case law, however, appears to have departed from this model by
treating "surplus water" as the property of a private individual. We do not believe
the departure represented "settled" law. Instead, as the following review of the
relevant caselaw and its impact demonstrates, Hawaii's law regarding surplus water
was at the time of McBryde in such a state of flux and confusion that it undoubtedly
frustrated those who sought to understand and apply it. The difficulty of insuring an
equitable distribution of unevenly flowing waters in the face of competing claims and
increasing demands made the delineation and application of a simplistic doctrine of
ownership well nigh impossible. McBryde was brought to use for decision in this
context.
Id. at 667-68, 658 P.2d at 306 (footnote omitted).
145 See Chang, Unraveling, supra note 21, at 86-87.
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decision, then the complaint filed in the federal district court had been
premature. The federal case was not ripe-not ready to be heard. 146  The
Supreme Court of the United States now had a basis by which to rule and
avoid the difficult constitutional question of whether or not the Hawai'i
Supreme Court had taken the plaintiffs' property. A ruling based on
ripeness would not, in a technical sense, forever foreclose plaintiffs' from
seeking relief. The sugar companies could file suit when property had
"really" been taken, namely at some future time when the State stopped the
sugar companies from withdrawing water.
The intuition that the United States Supreme Court did not want to rule on
the constitutional issue of a judicial taking proved accurate.1 4 7  The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari but vacated the injunction against
the Hawai'i Supreme Court, remanding to the Ninth Circuit on the basis of a
lack of ripeness.14 8  A win was a win. If the federal injunction was set
aside on any ground, the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson would
remain intact. It was much better to win on ripeness grounds than to risk
everything on the chance that the United States Supreme Court would hold
that federal courts were absolutely free to overrule earlier state court
decisions.14 9
The Ninth Circuit remanded to Judge Pence. However, Judge Pence
refused to follow the Supreme Court's suggestion that the case was not ripe.
Sticking to his guns, Judge Pence argued that the Solicitor General had
little knowledge of Hawai'i. 50 Pence even asserted that the Supreme Court
146 Id at 87.
147 The Supreme Court had never definitively ruled on the issue of whether state courts
could take property. See id. at 68-71 (discussing Edward A. Stimson, Retroactive
Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1939);
Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905)).
148 See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) ("Certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)."). Williamson
County was a ripeness decision.
149 Thus, in 1986 the United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit to examine whether Judge Pence had acted prematurely-whether the case was ripe.
The Supreme Court completely avoided the takings claim. The case was not ripe, for no
action had been taken on the original 1973 Abe decision. No waters had yet been seized.
150 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D. Haw. 1987).
A review of the record and briefs filed with the Supreme Court shows that less than
one month from the time The Court received the Solicitor General's brief, and only 14
days before the end of its 1985 term, it issued the above remand. . . . Since, as
indicated, this judge has concluded that it was the brief of the Solicitor General and his
uncritical assumption of "unripeness" of this case which triggered The Court's
granting certiorari and remand, therefore, this judge in this decision will primarily
address the position taken by the Solicitor General in his Amicus Brief.
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had acted hastily-being too busy in June to give the case its full
attention.'5 1 Judge Pence reaffirmed his earlier opinion, holding that a
taking had occurred regardless of Chief Justice Richardson's answers to the
certified questions in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. In doing so, Judge Pence
vehemently denounced the Richardson Court:
The Richardson Court's discussion of the takings issue sharply illustrates the
obfuscation and evasiveness of the Answers of that Court.152
One can only conclude that the above statements were deliberately and grossly
misleading (and, if presented in the federal courts, would mandate F. R. Civ.
P. Rule 11 sanctions). It was only in this federal court that the plaintiffs had
a full and uncircunscribed opportunity to raise the constitutional questions.153
When one reviews the 30-printed-page response of the Richardson Court to
the six questions, it becomes manifest that it was endeavoring, by
misdirection, misinformation, misapplication, and misconstruction of facts and
law to save its McBryde decisions and avoid the constitutional consequences
of its unprecedented radical and violent change in the law on waters in the
State of Hawaii. Cutting like a strand of barbed wire in the fabric of the
Richardson Court's artfully manufactured Answers is that Court's adamant
refusal to modify any rule set forth in McBryde.154
Reppun clearly and finally implemented McBryde's destruction of the value of
the water rights owned by several of the small owners, as well as G & R and
McBryde, who had purchased the same from owners of such appurtenant
rights, when it held that "the riparian water rights ... cannot be severed from
the land in any fashion.["] 155
As repeatedly and vehemently expressed above, after the court of appeals had
received the verbose and evasive Answers, it was clear to that court that
Id.
151 Id.
This judge draws the conclusion that The Court, "caught in the end of the term
crunch," and, having a high regard for all briefs filed by the Solicitor General of the
United States, simply followed the Solicitor General's recommendation that the
"petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted, the judgment of the court of appeals
vacated, and the case remanded to the court of appeals for further consideration in
light of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank," opting
not to decide the case at that time, and thus postponing, indefinitely, the
time-consuming effort involved in the ultimate disposition of the case.
Id.
152 Id. at 1017-18.
1' Id. at 1018.
154 Id. at 1019.
. Id. at 1020.
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McBryde I and II constituted a final judgment, taking away property of the
plaintiffs in violation of their constitutional rights.'
Judge Pence did not stop with that opinion. In parallel proceedings he
awarded four million dollars in attorneys' fees to the sugar companies. 57
Predictably, the Ninth Circuit, based on the instructions of the United
States Supreme Court, reversed Judge Pence and directed him to dismiss the
complaint based on a lack of ripeness.55 The Ninth Circuit also reversed
Judge Pence's ruling on attorneys' fees. 5 9
At long last, the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson was safe. It
had survived constitutional attack. As a personal matter, Richardson, as
chief justice, could not, and never did, publicly speak about the
controversy.160  He preferred to let counsel speak for him in public. Even
ten years after leaving the bench, in 1992, he refused to criticize Judge
Pence, noting only that Judge Pence had come down "pretty hard" on Justice
Abe.'6 '
The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson, attacked on a broad
front,16 2 would ultimately prevail. Today, some twenty years hence, the
156 id
15 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 703 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Haw. 1989).
158 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215, 216 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'g 676 F. Supp. 1002
(D. Haw. 1987).
15 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 933 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'g and vacating 703 F. Supp.
1412 (D. Haw. 1989).
160 DODD, supra note 20, at 61. Dodd described the Chief Justice thus:
Throughout reactive developments stemming from the Supreme Court's reversal of the
1959 decision of the Kauai court, Richardson remained quietly confident. He refused
to disqualify himself from the case. He was certain that his Court's McBryde
decision was justified. In private conversations with his friends, Richardson
expressed feelings of hurt and disappointment at Pence's injunction and statements to
the press. It seemed to the Chief Justice that Pence's written and spoken language
was injudicious and inappropriate, aimed personally at Richardson himself rather than
at the issues in the case.
Id.
161 Richardson Interview, supra note 27 ("Well, I thought he wrote some opinions that
used language that he should not have used. And I answered one of them just before I left
and that was one on the water rights case. And he was pretty tough on Justice Kazuhisa
Abe, and should not have been.").
162 The first of the shoreline boundary cases, In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76
(1968), also raised a firestorm of controversy. Justice Marumoto wrote a particularly
pointed dissent to Chief Justice Richardson's opinion. See id. at 318-46, 440 P.2d at 78-95
(Marumoto, J., dissenting). Among the bar there were powerful leaders who criticized the
Ashford decision. J. Russell Cades, a partner in one of the most prominent of Hawai'i's
law firms, wrote:
Again the floodgates of uncertainty have been let open and established precedent is, in
effect, overturned. What was believed to be the law of Hawaii virtually since the
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jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson is alive and thriving. Most
important, the "golden age" still lives. In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii
v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
resurrected section 7-1 and the 1850 statute awarding the people various
gathering and access rights. 6 3
McBryde, Sotomura, and Zimring were not radical departures from state
law. They were, if anything, the preference of Kingdom law over Territory
law. Territorial law was colonial law-an aberration.
The decisions rendered by Chief Justice Richardson were choice of law
decisions.'1' Chief Justice Richardson, in overturning territorial precedent,
faced a conflict of laws situation. The Supreme Court of the State of
Hawai'i faced issues of shoreline boundaries, water rights, and volcanic
accretion, and in deciding those cases it had to choose from among
competing "jurisdictions"-whether to apply the law of the Kingdom of
Hawai'i, the Provisional Government of Hawai'i, the Republic of Hawai'i,
or the Territory of Hawai'i.
The court was not making up law. The court was not reaching results
which no court had ever reached. The court was choosing law, not making
law. In addition, in this sense, as a conflict of laws problem, the
appropriate measure of the constitutionality of that choice should be the
limitations the United States Supreme Court has imposed on state supreme
courts.
In a number of cases, the United States Supreme Court has sought to
define the limits by which state supreme courts may choose to apply the law
of one jurisdiction over another.'65  There is only one case in which the
Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of substantive due process for a
court to apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction-and that is where there were
no connections or contacts whatsoever between the law to be applied and the
organized government of Hawaii has been established has been cast into darkness.
Every private title bordering on the sea, whether registered or unregistered, is affected
by this decision, and the titleholders, at least thus far, have had no opportunity to be
heard before any deliberative body.
Cades, supra note 9, at 65.
163 See Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 79 Haw. 425,
903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
' See LEA BRILMAYER & JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS
341-93 (5th ed. 2002).
165 Alllstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377
U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Emp'r Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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facts of the case. 1 Here, there is clearly a political connection between the
common law of statehood and that of the Kingdom. Section 1-1 of the
Hawai'i Revised Statutes provides sufficient contacts between the State of
Hawai'i and the laws of the Kingdom of Hawai' i. 67
In each of the critical property cases, the Chief Justice applied the law of
the Kingdom of Hawai'i, instead of the law of the Territory or the
Republic. 6 8  Section 1-1 commands the state court to look back to and
apply Hawaiian precedent, custom and usage, when and where such sources
are available. If, in applying section 1-1, the court chooses to overturn
intervening law, it may do so because it has the right and the power to do so.
The implications of section 1-1 and footnote 25 of Robinson v. Ariyoshi may
raise eyebrows, but they are not unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
William S. Richardson had a destiny. By ancestry, experience, and
temperament, he would prove to be the right person, at the right place, at the
right time. The man was made for the moment, and the moment was made
for the man.
The moment was statehood. How would the common law of property
evolve? Would the court borrow the common law of the continental
United States? Would the court simply persist in applying the property law
fashioned during the territorial period? Some believed that statehood, like
annexation in 1898, provided a fresh start, a blank slate, by which the
Hawai'i Supreme Court would rely solely on English and American
common law.
To Chief Justice Richardson, the slate was not blank. Hawai'i was
completely unique in American history. Hawai'i had once been a
Kingdom, a sovereign and independent nation. Property law was not free
to evolve. Rather, Hawai'i had an existing property law rooted in the
Kingdom of Hawai'i. In the flush of statehood, some in Hawai'i forgot the
significance of the Kingdom as the basis for property law.
Richardson looked to the Kingdom as shaping the law of property; this
was the command of section 1-1 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes. It
declared that Hawaiian judicial precedent, tradition, and usage were the law
of Hawai'i. Hawaiian law was primary. English and American common
law were incorporated only when not in conflict with Hawaiian law. Using
section 1-1, Richardson corrected erroneous precedents arising from the
'6 Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. 397.
167 See HAw. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (2009).
168 See cases cited supra note 64 and accompanying text.
137
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 33:99
territorial period and restored the principles and values that underlay the
concept of property established during the Kingdom of Hawai'i.
This intuition flowed naturally from his being Hawaiian. The Hawaiian
sense of the future is rooted in understanding the past. As one Hawaiian
scholar has written about the Hawaiian concept of the present:
It is interesting to note that in Hawaiian, the past is referred to as Ka wd
mamua, or "the time in front or before." Whereas the future, when thought
of at all, is Ka wa mahope, or "the time which comes after or behind." It is
as if the Hawaiian stands firmly in the present, with his back to the future and
his eyes fixed on the past, seeking historical answers to present day dilemmas.
Such an orientation is an eminently practical one, for the future is always
unknown, whereas the past is rich in glory and knowledge. It also bestows
upon us a natural propensity for the study of history.169
As William S. Richardson faced the future he looked to the past. He
relied on the concepts and practices of ancient Hawaiians to shape modem
property law. Life on an island, after all, is cyclical. The waters that wash
the shores, the rains that come and go, do so with an inevitable regularity.
What was good practice in the past, what worked yesterday as a way of life,
would work today. Hawaiians well knew how to live on islands. Their
property law was based in principles of communal ownership and
stewardship. This was the core of a successful and thriving society. For
the Chief Justice, the past was a guide for the future.
169 KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 59, at 22-23.
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